We use a laboratory experiment to study how mutual payoff information affects play in strategic settings. Subjects play the Prisoner's Dilemma or Stag Hunt game against randomly re-matched opponents under two information treatments. In our partial-information treatment subjects are shown only...

The search for a compromise between marginalism and egalitarianism has given rise to many discussions. In the context of cooperative games, this compromise can be understood as a trade-off between the Shapley value and the Equal division value. We investigate this compromise in the context of...

Researchers around the globe are searching for a "combo-drug" against COVID-19 by trying to combine various existing drugs. Given a set of such drugs, various algorithms (based, for example, on artificial intelligence) are used to identify the efficacy of different shares of the constituent...

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and...

Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some network structure. Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks. We give an overview of the most common models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in...

Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...

Pillage games (Jordan, 2006, “Pillage and property”, JET) have two features that make them richer than cooperative games in either characteristic or partition function form: they allow power externalities between coalitions; they allow resources to contribute to coalitions' power as well as...

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is...

We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of expenditure-minimizing...

There is continuing debate about what explains cooperation and self-sacrifice in nature and in particular in humans. This paper suggests a new way to think about this famous problem. I argue that, for an evolutionary biologist as well as a quantitative social scientist, the triangle of two...