We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market with transfers (Koopmans and Beckmann,1957; Shapley andShubik,1972; Becker,1973). Some theoretical predictions align with but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching,...

We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on Nash program by experimentally comparing the results of "structured" (non-cooperative) demand-based and offer-based mechanisms that implement the Shapley value as an ex-ante equilibrium outcome with the results of corresponding "semi-structured"...

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...