Once upon a time there was a little entrepreneur walking in the forest with a bag of new inventions-designed-to-shake-up-the-world. Along the way he met Big Bad Wolf, who was dressed in sheep’s wool."Where are you going, Little Entrepreneur?" asked Big Bad Wolf."I am going to Invention’s...

Focusing on collusive behavior, this chapter outlines the complexity associated with both the ex ante design of antitrust compliance programs and the ex post assessment of their impact. Following an interdisciplinary review of relevant literature, the chapter provides a structured cost–benefit...

An important action that is illegal according to competition law, both in the US and Europe, is predatory pricing. In this paper we develop a model that allows an entrant to sue an incumbent for predatory pricing. The cost of production is essential for judgments in such cases, and we allow the...

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against...

To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle...

There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the introduction of...

This paper clarifies the relation between per se hub-and-spoke and vertical rule of reason antitrust analysis, the tension between which is illustrated with a detailed examination of the Apple e-books case