This paper explores, theoretically and experimentally, a fixed-price mechanism bywhich, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. Ifdemand is uncertain, equilibrium consists in overstating true demand to alleviate theeffects of being rationed. Overstating is more...

This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism inwhich, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. Ifdemand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order toalleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect...

The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and conventions from the viewpoint of game theory and cognitive psychology. We claim that those two alternative approaches are complementary, as they provide different insights to explain how people...

Also published as Working Paper DFAEII 2009-05 and as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, pages 249-257.

Also published as Working Paper DFAEII 2009-05 and as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 69, issue 2, pages 249-257.