levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment …

We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long … time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher … cooperation, if (i) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances in …

We investigate whether peer punishment is an efficient mechanism for enforcing cooperation in an experiment with a long … time horizon. Previous evidence suggests that the costs of peer punishment can be outweighed by the benefits of higher … cooperation, if (i ) there is a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii ) punishment cannot be avenged. However, in most instances …

¤ects individuals' willingness to engage in altruistic punishment in a public good experiment in which the number of stages is …Altruistic punishment may promote cooperation, but can also lead to costly feuds. We examine how the threat of feuds a … determined by participants' actions. The design allows participants to use a range of punishment strategies. We nd that …

backfires as special agents extract significantly more resources. Introducing a peer punishment mechanism sustains contributions … stigmatization effect for the special agent as he receives substantially more peer punishment while contributions by other agents do … not change. Finally full transparency of all agents actions creates full accountability as it allows targeted punishment …

in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important … mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to … maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the …

punishment opportunities. One important challenge for the mechanism is imperfect information about cooperative behavior. It has … been shown that imperfect information increases misdirected punishment and thereby hampers the efficacy of the punishment … subjects choose to monitor either perfectly or not at all. Little punishment takes place with imperfect information. The large …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

goods game with endogenous third-party punishment in matrilineal and patriarchal societies in India. Our findings indicate …