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An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923374
Asymmetric information is widely considered to be a major obstacle to settlements. We argue that litigants facing asymmetric information can use a simple add-on to the settlement offer in order to overcome the information barriers to settlements. In particular, the informed party can promise to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854062
We develop a signaling model of final offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement … game. Relative to a model of conventional arbitration (CA), the pure strategy separating equilibrium is associated with a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246967
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178338
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At quilibrium the two parties never testify together. When theevidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014198890
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014052799
This chapter presents a strategic model of incentives for care and litigation under asymmetric information and self-serving bias, and studies the effects of damage caps. Our main findings are as follows. First, our results suggest that the defendant's bias decreases his expenditures on accident...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099050
Courts assessing compensatory damages awards often lack adequate information to determine the value of a victim's loss. A central reason for this problem, which the literature has thus far overlooked, is that courts face a dilemma when applying their standard information-forcing tool to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935655