In this paper I exploit a unique feature of the Greek institutional environment, whereby alternative cash compensation payments to directors are taxed differently from the point of view of both personal and corporate taxes. Specifically, board directors can receive cash compensation either in...

Companies grant compensatory option awards to provide retention and long term value creation incentives, aligning long term interests of shareholders and managers. The options issued by publicly traded companies in the US tend to be similar in design. Generally, the options are issued pursuant...

We show that firms with executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is...

This study explores the effects of financial and tax reporting incentives on options granted to chief executive officers in Canada. Extant studies with a similar purpose (Yermack, 1995, and Matsunaga, 1995) explore predominantly non-qualified U.S. option grants that are deductible to the extent...

This study tests whether the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) increased involuntary part-time (IPT) employment. Using data from the Current Population Survey between 1994 and 2014, we find that IPT employment in 2014 was higher than predicted based on economic conditions and...

We analyze the consequences of bonus taxes, limited deductibility of bonuses from company pro ts and a corporate income tax (CIT) in a principal-agent model and explore how these tax instruments a ffect managerial incentives and how they change the design of incentive contracts used in...

This paper tries to answer the question how taxation of corporate and individual income affects competition among firms for highly-skilled human resources like CEOs. It shows that individual income taxes can perform a substantial impact on the outcome of such a competition if marginal tax rates...

This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...

This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. corporations. We find that (i) the pay-size elasticity is much larger for privately held firms than for the publicly traded firms on which previous research has...

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax...