unobservable match heterogeneity explains a considerable proportion of the compensation variation. Firms compensate managers for …

-based pay. Family monitoring, risk aversion, and a reluctance to dilute family ownership all contribute to the pay differences …

to constraining managers' risk-shifting behaviors in the pre-violation stage, evidence reveals that strict covenants … higher CEO risk-shifting incentives significantly increase the likelihood of covenant violations. Evidence suggests that CEOs … with creditor unfriendly compensation in leveraged firms are more likely to engage in risk-shifting behaviors. As opposed …

imbalance between managers and shareholders. A comparative analysis of the kind undertaken in our study provides an additional …

, less concentrated industries, greater exposure to systematic risk, larger size, lower M/B, higher dividend yield, fewer … accounting performance and RPE awards of cash contingent on accounting performance convey the incentive to increase firm risk …

significantly less performance-based pay and equity-based pay. Family monitoring, risk aversion, and a reluctance to dilute family …

decisions, and greater failure risk. Finally, we show that CEOs with high ETIs are associated with unfavorable future career … outcomes, suggesting that corporate boards recognize that external promotion tournaments encourage managers to act …