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Per unit and ad valorem : royalties in a patent licensing game

Montinaro, Marta; Pal, Rupayan; Scimitore, Marcella - 2020

In a context of product innovation, we study two-part tariff licensing between a patentee and a potential rival which compete in a differentiated product market characterized by network externalities. The latter are shown to crucially affect the relative profitability of Cournot vs. Bertrand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012306713

Induced price leadership and (counter-)spying rivals' play under incomplete information

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2019

We analyze spying out a rival's price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962353

Regulating environmental externalities through public firms : a differential game

Dragone, Davide; Lambertini, Luca; Palestini, Arsen - 2011

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737230

Choosing roles under supply function competition

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2016

We investigate an extended game with observable delay under duopolistic competition in affine supply functions. Firms use the intercepts of supply functions as their strategic variables. Best replies are downward (upward) sloping if the common slope of supply functions is sufficiently low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705463

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Overconfidence and timing of entry

Santos-Pinto, Luis; Pires, Tiago - In: Games 11 (2020) 4/44, pp. 1-19

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432306

Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets

Marini, Marco A. - 2017

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660599

A Note on Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Duopolies

Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik - 2011

infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178724

Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games

Marini, Marco A.; Rodano, Giorgio - 2011

given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation … check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game …. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players' actions in the symmetric duopoly game are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179354

A Note on Evolutionary Stability of Bertrand Equilibrium

Hehenkamp, Burkhard; Leininger, Wolfgang - 1999

It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184323