We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

This paper describes the historical evolution of the analysis of some aspects of the strategic use of information. The use of mixed strategies aims to create uncertainty on the move to be played or on the private information of the players. In a repeated game framework, strategic behavior when...

If the allocation of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state - contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed...

The paper studies a behavioral learning process where an agent plays, at each period, an action with a probability which is proportional to the cumulative utility he got in the past with that action. The so-called CPR learning rule and the dynamic process it induces are formally stated and...

In contrast to the existing literature, which explains the recurrent cost problem as largely the result of institutional impediments to LDC welfare maximization, this paper analyzes the problem by constructing a series of scenarios in which the less developed country would be led to reduce the...

A review essay on Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, xx+503.

The DARPA Grand Challenge in which the Cornell Racing Team participates requires the completion of a Simulator, which purports all errors in the artificial intelligence path planning down below and back up. The simulator comes as the last layer in the top down approach followed by the Cornell...