Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...

We present a quantum solution to coordination problems that can be implemented with existing technologies. It provides an alternative to existing approaches, which rely on explicit communication, prior commitment or trusted third parties. This quantum mechanism applies to a variety of scenarios...

We consider marriage markets with externalities. We focus on weak externalities, that is, markets in which each agent is primarily concerned about her partner. We formalize and prove the claim that weak externalities are not so significant in the marriage market: in this case the ω-core and the...

Hierarchy plays an integral role in organizational structure and practices, as well as in society more generally. In Confucian-influenced cultures, and especially in South Korea, social hierarchies are often based on age, and age dynamics can therefore influence social decision-making and...

This paper studies multilateral negotiations among n players in an environment where there are externalities and where contracts forming coalitions can be written and renegotiated. The negotiation process is modeled as a sequential game of offers and counteroffers, and we focus on the stationary...

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...

The issue I want to take up here is how networks influence firm business not only from the costs and R&D side, but also from the demand side because of substitution - complementarity effects. In other words firms face networks at every intermediate level that has to meet the market. I will...

Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...

The win-win-win model may be proved to be a creative approach to conflict resolution Based on Nash’ 'Non Cooperative Game' and its 'win-win' situation (equilibrium point), according to which both parties involved in a negotiation may formulate winning strategies, Community involvement may be...

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...