We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games, J. of Economic Theory (2007), 117-137]...

In this note it is shown that in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox (AJPS, 1987) (repeated in a number of subsequent works), the uncovered set in a spatial voting situation does not necessarily coincide with the core even when the core is non-empty.

In this paper we examine whether an incentive scheme for improving research can have adverse effect on research itself. This work is mainly motivated by the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in UK. In a game theoretic framework we show that a scheme...

We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show...

We apply an intermediation game of Townsend (1983) to analyze trade in an exchange economy through endogenous intermediaries. In this game, each trader has the opportunity to become an intermediary by oering to buy or sell unlimited quantities of the commodities at a certain price vector and for...

In this paper we first explore the predictive power of the solution notion called conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), introduced by Greenberg (1990) in environments with farsighted players (as modelled in Xue (1998)) as intuitively it is quite nice. Unfortunately, we find that CSSB...

A link between a no-side-payment (NSP) market game and a side-payment (SP) market game can be established by introducing a sufficient amount of an ideal utility-money of constant marginal utility to all agents. At some point when there is "enough money" in the system, if it is "well distributed"...

In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported...

We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the dead line is kept fixed....

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe (J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994, 299-235) to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when prayers are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement. the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...