In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and...

We study a simple bargaining mechanism in which each player puts a prize to his resources before leaving the game. The only expected final equilibrium payoff can be defined by means of selective marginal contributions vectors, and it coincides with the Shapley value for convex games. Moreover,...

This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function for countably infinite societies. The function is defined for those profiles such that for each alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most is gdescribable.h The gdescribableh...

In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy gtops only.h That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third, . . . , or...

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience....

This paper studies the formation of networks among individuals. The focus is on the compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links. The paper reviews and synthesizes some previous results on the subject, and also provides new results on the existence...

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a...

We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determine a contribution group, public good provision level, and its cost-sharing. The...

We develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs. In the first stage, the players are forming coalitions and inside each coalition formed the members share the coalition benefits. We adopt the...

If agents negotiate openly and form coalitions, can they reach efficient agreements? We address this issue within a class of coalition formation games with externalities where agents' preferences depend solely on the coalition structures they are associated with. We derive Ray and Vohra's (1997)...