In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different … contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

This paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in duopoly market structure, if the managers' salary varies … the proportion of the incentive scheme that the managers get as a part of their salary, i.e. in equilibrium owners will …

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …In this experiment, the authors analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duooly. Owners can choose among two different …