Anecdotal evidence suggests that intermediaries are ubiquitous in corrupt activities; however, empirical evidence on their role as facilitators of corrupt transactions is scarce. This paper asks whether intermediaries facilitate corruption by reducing the moral or psychological costs of possible...

We model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials. We investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one's potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in...

It has been argued that accountability is a public good that only citizens can provide. Governments can put institutions in place that allow citizens to hold public servants to account, but citizens must participate in those institutions if accountability is to be achieved. Thus, citizens face a...

Employees of globalized firms face a more uncertain stream of earnings and riskier employment prospects. However, they also have stronger incentives to train and upgrade their skills and benefit from more rapid careers. Hence, the costs of uncertainty and the benefits of skill upgrading...

Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect.  When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms...

A corrupt transaction is often the result of bargaining between the parties involved.  This paper models bribery as a double auction where a private citizen and a public official strategically interact as the potential buyer and the potential seller of a corrupt service.  Individuals differ in...

Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external controls and the severity of punishment.  An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for reform.  Recent studies have shown that both top-down...

We experimentally investigate the extent to which social obervability of one's actions and the possibility of social non-monetary judgment affect the decision to engage in rule breaking behavior.  We consider three rule bfeaking scenarios - theft, bribery and embezzlement - in the absence of...

Economists have traditionally assumed that individual behavior is motivated exclusively by extrinsic incentives.  Social physchologists, in contrast, stress that intrinsic motivations are also important.  In recent work, economic theorists have started to build psychological factors, like...

Why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not?  Do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions?  In 2005, we conducted a bribery experiment and found that, among undergraduates, we could predict who would act corruptly...