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May 2000 - Some aspects of violent behavior are linked to economic incentives and deserve more attention from economists. In India, for example, domestic violence is used as a bargaining instrument, to extract larger dowries from a wife's family, after the marriage has taken place. Bloch and Rao...
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This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of path-persistence and consistency. We show that farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations always exist and...
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We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...
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This paper revisits the analysis of stable sets in two-player strategic-form games. Our two main contributions are (i) to establish a connection between myopic stable sets and the stable matchings of an auxiliary two-sided matching problem and (ii) to identify a structural property of 2-player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215802
This paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, each individual must have the incentive to abide by those norms, and so we investigate the structure of stable insurance networks, in which self-enforcement constraints are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060544
We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071738