We examine a comprehensive set of private and public security issuance decisions by publicly traded companies. We study private and public issues of debt, convertibles and common equity securities - a total of 6 different security-market choices. The market for public firms issuing private...

This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that...

We study a search model of investors' asset trading, intermediated by financial institutions that are at risk of selling under pressure. The pressure can lead to the development of a secondary market, where intermediaries bail each other out. Counterintuitively, an increase in competing...

We examine public firms' issues of private and public debt, convertibles, and common equity securities. The market for public firms issuing private securities is large. Of the over 13,000 issues we examine, more than half are in the private market. We find that asymmetric information plays a...

This paper develops a dynamic model of tender offers in which there is trading on the target's shares during the takeover, and bidders can freeze out target shareholders (compulsorily acquire remaining shares not tendered at the bid price), features that prevail on almost all takeovers. We show...

This paper studies multilateral negotiations among n players in an environment where there are externalities and where contracts forming coalitions can be written and renegotiated. The negotiation process is modeled as a sequential game of offers and counteroffers, and we focus on the stationary...

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...

An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time, an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a...

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is...