We introduce externalities into a two-sided, one-to-one assignment game by letting the values generated by pairs depend … that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic …

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …

This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in apex games under the following assumptions: first, payoff … division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition … can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions).In contrast with the results of other …

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …

show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …