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multiple majority coalitions (pivotality) or from the relative vote share the agent contributes to a coalition (proportionality …). We distinguish between coalitional commitment, where parties defer distributive bargaining when forming a coalition, and … allocative commitment, where allocations are determined at the point of coalition formation. We show how the timing of commitment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241611
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing two coalitional games. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718527
Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a … show that given this power configuration there is a coalition which is both internally and Nash stable. We consider two … investigate how infeasible coalition might affect the outcome and apply our model to the German parliament …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189489
The world's first multinational electricity market was formed with the creation of the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool. We analyze the incentives to undertake transmission network investment in the context of the liberalized Nordic electricity market. Welfare improving investment in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926087
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805951
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316670
We study frictionless matching and coalition formation environments. Agents have preferences over coalitions, and these … preferences, we show that there exists a core stable coalition structure in every state of nature if, and only if, agents …' preferences are pairwise-aligned in every state of nature. In particular, we establish that there is a stable coalition structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137365
weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822445
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191203
class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179639