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We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642
characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012195202
We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is … strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of Roth (1982) obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show … result of Demange et al. (1987) obtained in the absence of externalities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845795
potential partners but also over what other matches occur. Once such externalities are considered, the set of stable matchings …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067988
the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592935
externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be …A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when … which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterize the resulting payoff …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061766
rationality under a certain condition, and well balances the trade-off between coalition effects and externality effects. By …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069994
condition is imposed as well, the existence of Nash stable partitions. -- Coalition formation ; Nash stability ; Partitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731618
This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591399