Showing 81 - 90 of 51,843
We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054349
externalities that create a coordination problem among principals. Contract disclosure enables principals to design the contract … consider externalities on other principals caused by the effects of their contract choices on the monitor's scrutiny allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294613
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005836394
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010797762
We introduce externalities into a two-sided, one-to-one assignment game by letting the values generated by pairs depend … that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734770
We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735014
When there are three parties, it is well known that the Coase Theorem may not hold even when there are no transaction costs, due to the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game [Aivazian and Callen (1981)]. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107924
We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332666
We introduce externalities into a two-sided, one-to-one assignment game by letting the values generated by pairs depend … that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208655
the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325128