Common ownership exists when investors concurrently hold partial and significant shares in related firms. In this paper, I compile, document, and taxonomize 30 separate cases of intervention to demonstrate how common owners influence firm behavior. Although previous literature has identified a...

By introducing asymmetric information of investors' abilities and finitely repeated games into the classic hold-up model, this paper revisits the relationship between property rights and reputation under incomplete contracting environment and obtains some different insights. First, even facing...

Most antitrust scholars agree that vertical and horizontal intrabrand restraints such as minimum resale price maintenance and ancillary exclusive territories usually enhance welfare. Nonetheless, there is not universal agreement regarding how, exactly, such restraints have this impact. Following...

We develop a model in which multinational investors decide about the modes of organization, the locations of production, and the markets to be served. Foreign investments are driven by market-seeking and cost-reducing motives. We further assume that investors face costs of control that vary...

In contemporary market economies, firms typically adopt one or another of a small number of standard organizational forms, both in terms of ownership and in terms of commitments to contractual counterparties. This review essay, prepared as a chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Organizational...

Like many professional sports leagues worldwide, the National Basketball Association is organized as a cooperative of team owners. We argue that league ownership structures must balance two types of transaction costs: the costs of contracting with stakeholders of the league, importantly players,...

A fundamental question for economics is why large firms in market economies usually assign control rights to capital suppliers rather than labor suppliers. A diverse collection of answers can be found in the literature. But unfortunately little theoretical consensus has emerged, and few attempts...

It is well-known that a seller imposed non-discrimination clause can soften downstream price competition by constraining opportunistic pricing behavior on the part of an upstream monopolist seller. But what about about market settings in which there exists a pivotal buyer? We show that in the...