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We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who,...
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enforceable contracts is costly. A contract can describe contingencies and actions at a more or less detailed level, and the cost … of writing a contract is proportional to the amount of detail. We consider both formal (externallyenforced) and informal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012756466
Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their …
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optimal contract duration. We study the trade-off between contracting costs due to repeated bilateral bargaining and the risk … of transaction cost economics, whereas the need for flexibility reduces contract duration. With increasing bilateral … trading experience between the same trading partners, contract duration decreases. We additionally observe that countries …
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This paper proposes a dynamic approach to modeling opportunism in bilateral vertical contracting between an upstream monopolist and competing downstream firms. Unlike previous literature on opportunism which has focused on games in which the upstream firm makes simultaneous secret offers to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250915
the signals relative to the variance of the trembles captures the degree of contract secrecy. We find that a higher degree …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256170
of enforceability that inhibits an agent's ability to renege on the contract and a level of auditing that inhibits his … ability to conceal income. The dynamics of the optimal contract imply an endogenous lower bound on the lifetime utility and … consumption of an agent, strictly positive auditing at all points in the contract and positive enforcement only when the agent …
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