We present a model of endogenous public good provision and group rent-seeking influence e.g. lobbying. Specifically, two groups with different preferences over public good consumption and different sizes engage in rent-seeking activities to influence policymaking in their preferred direction....

If local public goods exhibit spillovers and regions are sufficiently symmetric, decentralization implies underprovision, whereas cooperative centralization is associated with strict Pareto-improvement. This classic inference rests on two assumptions: local politicians are delegated sincerely...

This paper examines the effect of immigration on the level of income redistribution via majority voting on the income tax. As a main result, we derive multiple tax equilibria if immigrants are allowed to vote and the skill composition of natives is not too homogeneous. In this case, the outcome...

People not only obtain utility from actual outcomes but also from the conditions which lead to these outcomes. The paper proposes an economic concept of this notion of procedural utility. Preferences beyond outcome can be manifold. We distinguish procedural utility people get from institutions...

This paper presents a political economy approach to payroll tax competition between countries adopting different systems of social insurance.

A couple of months before the Swedish election in 1998, the incumbent government distributed 2.3 billion SEK to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities. This was the first wave of a four-year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable...

People not only obtain utility from actual outcomes but also from the conditionswhich lead to these outcomes. The paper proposes an economic concept of this notion ofprocedural utility. Preferences beyond outcome can be manifold. We distinguish proceduralutility people get from institutions as...

Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government’s taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenue-raising authority in light of social...

I investigate how political uncertainty influences corporate investment decisions employing a unique panel dataset of German manufacturing firms. I use data on firms' self-reported investment realizations, plans and revisions. The firm-specific user cost of capital captures the current...

Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government's support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and...