policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

spillovers in technology agreements. We utilize the coalition-proof concept to refine the set of Nash equilibria and identify …

The Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (PCPN) concept is extended to allow for the emergence of overlapping … national damage from global pollution. We also show that: (i) continental agreements may be perfectly coalition-proof under … the Grand Coalition’s optimal allocation in the presence of coalitional operation costs …

players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called optimal sharing which … stabilises all cartels that are possibly stable under any rule. Under optimal sharing the grand coalition is the unique stable … cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called non-essentiality and determine the set of stable …