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Experimentation and Signal Dampening in Agency--The Ratchet Effect Revisited

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Mirman, Leonard J.; Salgueiro, Egas M. - 1999

that after the first period the principal designs a second contract, taking the information available about the state of … separating first period contract is optimal. The second change is that, unlike the deterministic setting where the high type …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202378

The Simple Analytics of Information and Experimentation in Dynamic Agency

Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Mirman, Leonard J.; Salgueiro, Egas M. - 2003

over time. Contracts are short term. The principal designs the second contract, taking the information available about the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029850

Incentive complexity, bounded rationality and effort provision

Abeler, Johannes; Huffman, David; Raymond, Collin - 2023

over-provide effort relative to a fully rational benchmark, and improves efficiency. We identify contract features, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014311541

Non-common priors, incentives, and promotions : the role of learning

Fahn, Matthias; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - 2023

updates beliefs using Bayes' rule. An exploitation contract in which the agent is only compensated for his effort if the extra … profit materializes maximizes the principal's profits. In this optimal contract, the agent's principal-expected compensation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014292070

Firms, markets, and contracts : contributions to neoinstitutional economics

Picot, Arnold (ed.) - 1997 - Corrected 2. printing

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000591244

Endogenous information and stochastic contracts

Terstiege, Stefan - In: Games and economic behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 535-547

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009703102

Contractual Design in Agency Problems with Non-Monotonic Cost and Correlated Information

Danau, Daniel - 2017

We model an agency relationship in which the agent's cost is non-monotonic with respect to type and the type is correlated with a public ex-post signal. The principal can use lotteries to exploit the type-signal correlation within the limit of the agent's liability. We establish conditions for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960462