This work studies the dynamics of international, multilateral, legal negotiations. It seeks to understand how the participants in a multilateral negotiation on a new international law instrument actually behave and why they do so. To this end, it provides a rich historical narrative of the...

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

The finite horizon version of a popular legislative bargaining model due to Baron and Ferejohn is investigated. With three or more rounds of bargaining a continuum of distributions are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria in Markov strategies. Allowing for history dependent strategies...

This paper proposes a method to estimate relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, we present a bargaining model of government formation and estimate structural parameters of the model using data for (i) who the formateurs are, (ii) what each party's voting weight...

This paper studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Our devised model essentially blends Spence's signaling and the coalition formation of majoritarian bargaining. The main findings include: (i) oversized coalitions may...

It is well known that being the proposer or agenda setter is advantagenous in many collective decision making situations. In the canonical model of distributive bargaining (Baron and Ferejon, 1989), proposers are certain of being part of the coalition that forms, and, conditional on being in the...

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we propose a theoretical framework casting some lights on the drawbacks of bicameral state legislatures and on the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers...

We show that a large electorate of ignorant voters can succeed in establishing high levels of electoral accountability. In our model an incumbent politician is confronted with a large number of voters who receive very noisy signals about her performance. We find that the accountability problem...