The traditional normative literature on fiscal federalism argues that redistributive policies should be centralized in order to avoid welfare- or tax-induced migration. However, recent evidence shows that even in a setup where the progressivity of the income tax schedule is centralized to an...

We develop a political economy model of intergovernmental transfers. Vertical fiscal balance occurs in a federation when the ratio of the marginal benefit of the public services provided by the federal and provincial governments is equal to their relative marginal costs of production. With...

Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental fiscal relations reform have become nearly ubiquitous in developing countries. Performance, however, has often been disappointing in terms of both policy formulation and outcomes. The dynamics underlying these results have been poorly researched....

This paper addresses two long-standing positive questions in public finance: 1) Why is the property tax, despite widespread popular complaints against its fairness, the almost exclusive tax instrument used by local governments; and 2) why do we consistently observe higher levels of governments...

The paper develops a simple multi-jurisdictional model of residential and political choice. Analyzing the interplay of migration, local policies, and geographic factors, we show that equilibrium tax regimes depend on the geographical size of jurisdictions. If geographical differences are modest...

This papers reviews main topics concerning sub-national revenues (intergovernmental transfers and taxes) and discusses some policy options to develop own sub-national revenues. The review covers the political-legal framework and the fiscal outcomes, finding that: i) intergovernmental transfers...