We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.

We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the...

n this paper we show that in a simple spatial model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if the outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficient equal to their share of votes, essentially only a two-party equilibrium exists. The two...

We present a model where a society elects a parliament by voting for candidates belonging to two parties. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single-district proportional. In this framework, the...

The citizen-candidate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained...

We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultane- ous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by ma- jority rule in a local district. The policy to be...

In this paper we propose a model with uncertainty in which strategic voters vote, under poportional rule, for a Parliament and parties bargain to form a government. We prove that only consensus government form and only extreme parties take votes.