In this paper, we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e., with two or more candidates elected with positive probability), is regular and, hence, a Mertens' stable set. Furthermore,...

In this note we discuss two examples of appoval voting games. The first one, with six voters and three candidates, has a unique stable set,where each voter approves only his most preferred candidate. This strategy coincides with the sophisticated one, while other strategy combinations, leading...

In this paper we show, via some simple examples, that also in the class of games we are dealing with, there are perfect equilibria that are not proper and, moreover, some "proper" outcome is not induced by any stable set. Furthermore, we show that the perfect concept does not appear restrictive...