This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i )...

An increasing reliance on solar and wind power has raised concern about system ability to consistently satisfy electricity demand. This paper examines countries' unilateral incentives to achieve supply security through capacity reserves and market integration in a multinational electricity...

The capacity of the transmission network determines the extent of integration of a multinational energy market. Cross-border externalities render coordination of network maintenance and investments across countries valuable. Is it then optimal to collect powers in the hands of a single...

I analyze renewable electricity policy in a multinational electricity market with transmission investment. If national policy makers choose support schemes to maximize domestic welfare, then a trade policy motive arises operating independently of any direct benefit of renewable electricity. The...

I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in call demand. Empirical work has shown call demand to increase significantly with income. For any positive income effect, network operators prefer a termination rate above marginal cost if networks are...