Recent theories (Rabin, 2002; Rabin and Vayanos, 2010) propose that both the Gambler's Fallacy and the Hot Hand Fallacy are driven by Representativeness Bias, also known as the Law of Small Numbers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). The Lucky Store Effect (Guryan and Kearney, 2008), in which the...

How does an individual's position within a social distribution influence their desire to take risk? Reference-dependent loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007) adapted to a social setting, suggests that individuals may find risk more appealing when they are doing...

This paper describes the challenges consumers, insurers and insurance regulators face in dealing with insurance for low-probability high-consequence events. Given their limited experience with catastrophes, there is a tendency for all three parties to engage in short-term intuitive thinking...

This paper presents a new decision theory for modelling choice under risk. The new theory is a two-parameter generalization of expected utility theory. The proposed theory assumes that a decision maker: 1) behaves as if maximizing expected utility; but 2) may experience disappointment (elation)...

The decision maker is assumed to observe a large number of experiments. The paper presents conditions for the existence of a unique prior over distributions that generate each of the observed samples. The axioms over experiments admit a recursive non-expected utility representation over...

Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion....

Is the assumption that people automatically know their own preferences innocuous? We present an experiment studying the limits of preference discovery. If tastes must be learned through experience, preferences for some goods may never be learned because it is costly to try new things, and thus...

We model an ‘anxious' agent as one who is more risk averse with respect to imminent risks than with respect to distant risks. Based on a utility function that captures individual subjects' behavior in experiments, we provide a tractable theory relaxing the restriction of constant risk aversion...

This paper presents a new two-parameter probability weighting function for Tversky and Kahneman (1992) cumulative prospect theory as well as its special cases — Quiggin (1981) rank-dependent utility and Yaari (1987) dual model. The proposed probability weighting function can be inverse...

We introduce a simple, easy to implement instrument for jointly eliciting risk and ambiguity attitudes. Using this instrument, we structurally estimate a two-parameter model of preferences. Our findings indicate that ambiguity aversion is significantly overstated when risk neutrality is assumed....