Showing 1 - 10 of 108,765
war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the … only cause of war under commitment problems and that commitment problems per se are not necessarily a cause of war even if … muss, in zukünftigen Verhandlungen mit einem militärisch stärker werdenden Staat, ein schlechteres Verhandlungsergebnis zu …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009711293
We analyze a dynamic model of bargaining and war with rich sets of strategic options. There are two states located on a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322063
shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, the rejected offer determines how conflict is played if negotiations fail. In turn …, how players are expected to play during conflict determines their negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations … brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014036192
The rise of a new power may lead the dominant power to seek a preventive war. We study this scenario in an experimental … preventive wars when the power shift is smaller and when the rising state has the commitment power. Communication and repeated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012801942
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014470418
the two contrasting forms of communication, we find that the average agreed prices of the two treatments are identical …. But when subjects can talk, fewer offers are exchanged, negotiations finish faster, the likelihood of reaching agreement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014356737
Consider a society where ethnic conflict is imminent due to people's belief about the state of the world. An `informed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904240
I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage---when there is some positive probability that players may have learned their private types---and the chosen mechanism is implemented at the interim stage. For these problems, I define almost ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854555
Mediator proposals can accelerate agreement and increase welfare even if the mediator is entirely uninformed. We demonstrate this by adding random mediation to the Cramton (1992) bargaining model. Mediation increases welfare by pooling types, which reduces signaling costs. When mediation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240900
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014550723