We develop a game-theoretic model to study the subscription choices of subscribers with diverse ideological perspectives between two opposing news media (intermediaries) who are motivated to influence the public opinion through their roles of news verification and selective disclosure. The...

We study a model of online news dissemination on a Twitter-like social network. Given a news item and its credibility, agents with heterogeneous priors strategically decide whether to share the news with their followers. An agent shares the news, if the news can persuade her followers to take an...

In this paper, we study a model of online news dissemination on a Twitter-like social network. Given a noisy observation of the state of the world henceforth called the news, agents with heterogeneous priors decide whether to share with their followers based on whether receiving the news can...

We study rebate mechanisms according to which a monopolist selling a product introduces rebates as function of the volume of buyers. This enables the firm to induce payoff externalities that ordinarily do not exist. The monopoly firm sells an indivisible good to a mass of consumers with...

We study the problem of optimal dynamic pricing for a monopolist selling a product to consumers in a social network. In the proposed model, the only means of spread of information about the product is via Word of Mouth communication; consumers' knowledge of the product is only through friends...

We develop a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks when the information required for learning a payoff-relevant parameter may not be at the disposal of any single agent. Individuals engage in communication with their neighbors in order to learn from their experiences. However,...

We develop a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks when the information required for learning a parameter may not be at the disposal of any single agent. Individuals engage in communication with their neighbors in order to learn from their experiences. However, instead of...