The lack of complete information has been considered as a barrier to the optimal regulation. This paper shows that this is true for price regulation, but not for entry regulation. The performance of an entry regulation under asymmetric information can be better than that under complete...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal rate of money supply growth when a moral hazard problem in an insurance market makes the risk diversification incomplete. The analysis is based on a simple overlapping generations model of fiat money with idiosyncratic uncertainty. Without...

I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In...

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with...

The paper has three main objectives. The first of these aims to clarify the term and the motivations behind such actions. The second objective is to circumscribe the identification of the legislative and institutional elements regarding whistle blowing, currently existing in Romania. The third...

This paper provides a signaling-game theoretical foundation for empirically testing the effects of quality report cards in the U.S. health care industry. It shows that, when health care providers face an identical distribution of patient illness severities, a trade-off between multidimensional...

Plott, Wit & Yang (2003) conduct a betting market experiment and nd: First, information was aggregated. This suggests that traders updated their private information based on observed market odds. Second, a model based only on the use of private information seems to fit their data best. The...

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...

A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained...

I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information. (JEL: D23, D82, D86, L20) (c) 2010 by the European Economic Association.