We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a network learn about an … neighbors are mutually independent. We introduce a new metric of information diffusion in social learning, which is weaker than …

We analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem with moral hazard and private learning. Each period the agent faces a …

This paper studies sequential social learning when people learn about others' actions through coarse signals. Agents … learning occurs, i.e., agents eventually learn the truth and take the correct actions. A necessary condition for adequate … learning is that the state-signals can induce unbounded private likelihoods. When private likelihoods are unbounded, adequate …

We analyze a game theoretic model of social learning about a consumption good with endogenous timing and heterogeneous …

We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer’s value evolves endogenously because of learning-by-consuming. A … compatibility. Our results help to understand contracts about sequential consumption with the learning feature; e.g., leasing …

taking an (irreversible) action. We define \textit{asymptotic learning} as the fraction of agents taking the correct action … converging to one as a society grows large. Under truthful communication, we show that asymptotic learning occurs if (and under … ``information hubs'', which receive and distribute a large amount of information. Asymptotic learning therefore requires information …