We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense … and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense … and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premune-ation values—the values to the …

We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense … and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching …

We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible … of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matching market in …-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one market? First, we provide sufficient …

in a generalized job matching model …

We consider a hybrid model at the intersection of the standard two-sided matching market as proposed by Gale and … if this structure shares similarities with the classical two-sided matching framework, we show an important difference …. However, we show that, in this housing market framework, there always exists a Pareto-efficient matching that is not blocked …

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility …

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often … room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic …

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in trading networks …