We treat government concessions as additions to an expected payoffs schedule rather than as being synonymous with it. Government concessions that add to terrorists' expected payoffs past some point on a positively sloped risk-reward trade-off schedule will not make all terrorists more risk...

We study terrorist choice from the perspective of economics and psychology. Using RAND-MIPT data about the injuries and fatalities inflicted by different terrorist attack methods, we compute sets of preference orderings over the attack methods using prospect theory. This incorporates reference...

We test whether immigrants are more prone to support terror than natives because of lower opportunity costs, using the international World Values Survey data. We show that, in general, economically, politically and socially non-integrated persons are more likely to accept using violence for...

Famous cultural monuments are often regarded as unique icons, making them an attractive target for terrorists. Despite huge military and police outlays, terrorist attacks on important monuments can hardly be avoided. We argue that an effective strategy for discouraging terrorist attacks on...

This paper looks at the case where there are two branches of a terrorist group, which operate in two different locations targeting two different countries and regions. This does away with the free rider’s problem arising out of pre-emption that has been highlighted in the literature. The free...