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Lindstädt, René; Staton, Jeffrey K. - 2010

Followers of law, politics and business commonly relate stories of individuals who appear to predict an expected self-performance level below what they believe likely. Candidates, attorneys and firms sometimes seem to under-predict their own capacities. Insofar as individuals typically construct...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047090

Quality monitoring, collusion and sub-contracting

Kuhn, Michael; Yan, Qianhui - 2006

We discuss the social welfare improvement under centralized and decentralized hierarchies and focus on supervisoris ability to monitor quality. Although the possibility of collusion against the principal is eliminated under decentralized hierarchy, the decentralization is dominating only if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003884606

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory model

Fiocco, Raffaele; Gilli, Mario - 2011

Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009266952

What's the damage? : environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - 2014

Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380647

What's the damage? : environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats

Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - 2014 - This Version: January 31, 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338152

Political corruption in the execution of public contracts

Chiappinelli, Olga - 2016

This paper presents a novel theory of corruption in public procurement. It considers an agency setting of contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011532685

Allocating awards across noncomparable categories

Magee, Lonnie; Veall, Michael R. - 2002

Suppose an agency awards a fixed number of prizes to applicants in different categories such that the applicant-to-winner ratio is constant by category. It is demonstrated in a simple theoretical model that the number of awards in a category will typically be positively related to the degree of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414229

Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System

Otáhal, Tomáš - 2012

synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking. More precisely, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting … the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to … (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113439

Siting Public Facilities : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Nimby Syndrome in Italy

Occhilupo, Roberta - 2011

The paper discusses the economic problem and the institutional features underlying the Nimby syndrome, and illustrates preliminary empirical evidence for Italy. It argues that siting procedures taking local preferences into account should be preferred when the heterogeneity in preferences across...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117763

Agency Problems and Political Institutions

Mitnick, Barry M. - 2013

develop both theory and prescription in agency settings. Particular problems are displayed almost like games (e.g., the "Major …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074677