This paper considers physician agency in choosing drugs to treat metastatic breast cancer, a clinical setting in which patients have few protections from physicians’ rent seeking. Physicians have explicit financial incentives attached to each potential drug treatment, with profit margins...

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule there exist balanced transfers that render...

Objective: To determine and compare the cost utilities of the tumour necrosis factor (TNF) antagonists adalimumab and infliximab as maintenance therapies for patients in the US with moderately to severely active Crohn's disease. Methods: Maintenance regimens of adalimumab (40 mg every other...

Individuals with finite private information independently choose acts and messages. Their utilities may depend on all acts and information, including the center's. Incentive payments are separable and fully transferable. Implementable incentives making specified behavior a Bayesian equilibrium...