In this paper, we characterize the set of pure strategy undominated equilibria in differentiated Bertrand oligopolies with linear demand and constant unit costs when firms may prefer not to produce. When all firms are active, there is a unique equilibrium. However, there is a continuum of...

Consider two sequential-move models with private demand or cost information: 1) n firms set outputs sequentially and 2) one manufacturer sets the wholesale price, and then n retailers set outputs simultaneously. In the first model, large Stackelberg markets aggregate information efficiently. The...

This study pursues how waitlists should be designed to achieve desirable outcomes in canonical object allocation models. We introduce myopic and farsighted stability notions. Our first mechanism—Deferred Acceptance with Straightforward Waitlists (DSW )—is myopically stable and...

We investigate agents' incentives to form mergers (or groups) by sharing their private information and the associated welfare effects in aggregative games. The merging agents always have incentives to share their information with each other in horizontal/conglomerate merger games. A merger...