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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305660
We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual’s earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a certain threshold, a risk of collective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014264592
We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual's earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a certain threshold, a risk of collective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014264957
We study the influence of risk and time preferences on trust and trustworthiness by conducting a field experiment in Vietnamese villages and by estimating the parameters of the Cumulative Prospect Theory and of quasi-hyperbolic time preferences. We find that while probability sensitivity or risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165837
We investigate experimentally ingratiatory behavior expressed by opinion conformity. Both individuals’ performance at a task and their opinions on various topics can be observed before unequal payoffs are assigned by a second mover. In some treatments, first movers can change their opinion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170032
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In this paper, we investigate individuals’ investment in status in an environment where no monetary return can possibly be derived from reaching a better relative position. We use a real-effort experiment in which we permit individuals to learn and potentially improve their relative position...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014186505
We investigate how different forms of scrutiny affect dishonesty, using Gneezy's (2005) deception game. We add a third player whose interests are aligned with those of the sender. We find that lying behavior is not sensitive to revealing the sender's identity to the observer. The option for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029719
Humans shape the behavior of artificially intelligent algorithms. One mechanism is the training these systems receive through the passive observation of human behavior and the data we constantly generate. In a laboratory experiment with a sequence of dictator games, we let participants' choices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227091