This article extends the theory of network competition by allowing receivers to derive a surplus from receiving calls and to affect the volume of communications by hanging up. We investigate how receiver charges affect internalization of the call externality. When the receiver charge and the...

We study the optimal mechanism for downsizing the public sector which takes into account different informational constraints (complete versus asymmetric information on each worker's efficiency) and political constraints (mandatory versus voluntary downsizing). Under complete information, the...

We study the optimal mechanism for downsizing the public sector which takes into account different informational constraints (complete versus asymmetric information on each workers efficiency) and political constraints (mandatory versus voluntary downsizing). Under complete information, the...

This article analyzes the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector, focusing on adverse selection in productive efficiency. Each worker is assumed to have two type-dependent reservation utilities: the status quo utility in the public sector before downsizing and the utility that the...