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Azar, Pablo D.; Micali, Silvio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 553-578

Collecting and processing large amounts of data is becoming increasingly crucial in our society. We model this task as evaluating a function f over a large vector x=(x1,…,xn), which is unknown, but drawn from a publicly known distribution X. In our model, learning each component of the input x...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856697

Dynamic Moral Hazard and Risk-Shifting Incentives in a Leveraged Firm

Rivera, Alejandro - 2019

I develop an analytically tractable model that integrates the risk-shifting problem between bondholders and … exacerbates the risk-shifting problem. An optimal contract binds shareholders and the manager. The flexibility of this contract … optimal contract amplifies the upside thereby increasing shareholder appetite for risk-shifting. Moreover, some empirical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900700

Securitization and Optimal Retention Under Moral Hazard

Malekan, Sara - 2012

quality to ensure that they can repay the loans, because the risk of delinquencies falls on investors rather than lenders. One …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107803

Transparency and Performance Evaluation in Sequential Agency

Cato, Susumu - 2017

This study investigates the effects of transparency in a sequential moral hazard problem, where a leader and a follower consecutively take an action. The principal chooses whether the organization is transparent or opaque, by which we mean that the action of the leader is observable to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971291

Enforcement of Optimal Disclosure Rules in the Presence of Moral Hazard

Versano, Tsahi - 2020

This paper analyzes the role of disclosure enforcement mechanisms (such as SEC enforcement teams and corporate governance systems) in directing the disclosure practices of managers when the information is used by shareholders to monitor the manager. The paper establishes a role for a disclosure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846123

Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and Limited Liability

Mekonnen, Teddy - 2020

I consider a moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties, limited liability, and an informed principal. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853305

Team Design under Moral Hazard

Starmans, Jan - 2020

This paper studies team design in the context of a standard risk-neutral principal-agent model with contractual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012832543

Monitoring experts

Azrieli, Yaron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1313-1350

We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806483

Participation in Moral Hazard Problems

Roger, Guillaume - 2015

Two principals engage in Hotelling competition for an agent's services under incomplete information as to her outside option (location). This renders the agent's participation decision probabilistic from the perspective of each principal. Regardless of the market structure at equilibrium the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009980

A Note on Moral Hazard and Linear Compensation Schemes

Wang, Xiao Yu - 2013

-agent problems in risky environments subject to moral hazard, such as the effect of risk and moral hazard considerations on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078876