This paper studies a principal-agent model in which the principal and agent are risk-neutral, there are two actions, adverse selection, moral hazard and limited liability. When the two actions are subject to moral hazard, there is no distortion at the top, the optimal action profile is downward...

In this paper we investigate principal-agent problems with moral hazard and target budgets. The latter requires that the principal fixes a total budget for wages paid to agents regardless of their outputs realized ex post. Target budgets are relevant not just because they are exogenous...

In many countries, lenders are not permitted to use information about past defaults after a specified period of time has elapsed. We model this provision and determine conditions under which it is optimal. We develop a model in which entrepreneurs must repeatedly seek external funds to finance a...

In a multi-agent contracting setting, agents' performances are related due to both correlating noise and effort spillover. We study the optimal linear contract in which the agents are risk averse. Putting compensation weights on peers' performances helps to filter out common noise, which relaxes...

I explore the theoretical properties of earnings, prices, and compensation contracts under the assumption that strategic managers are evaluated based on audited financial reports of their own making. If auditors require managers to provide verifiable evidence substantiating the contents of their...

The paper argues that the industrial organization of the financial services market is determined by the allocation of liability to repay investors. Based on the allocation of liability, the paper examines all the possible modes of organizing finance and delegated monitoring in an economy with...

This note identifies a moral hazard environment in which a piecewise linear compensation scheme is optimal. Both the principal and the agent have CARA utility, mean output is increasing in the agent's non-contractible input, and output is distributed according to a Laplace distribution, which...

We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The...

This paper studies an infinite horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to...