Do rating announcements reduce information asymmetries? We investigate the effect of rating disclosures on the volatility and liquidity of the US bond market. Although rating agencies' decisions often are anticipated by credit spread changes, we show that in the case of no regulatory change...

Market design matters when heterogeneous borrowers roll over loans, facing funding shocks. Borrower anonymity is a key feature of various financial markets, such as short term, interbank lending markets. We show that anonymous markets experience systemic runs for large shocks, but provide...

Can banks trade credit default swaps (CDSs) referenced on their current corporate clients at competitive prices, or are banks penalized for potentially holding private information? To answer this question we merge CDS trades reported under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)...

Using borrower-level data from FINCA, one of Peru's leading microfinance institutions (MFIs), this paper evaluates the effect on borrowers' access to credit of FINCA's decision to share information on individual outstanding debt records (positive information) as well as group default records...

I study hold-up in bank lending and the effects of information sharing on this adverse selection problem. I derive testable hypotheses by augmenting the model in Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007). For empirical identification, I exploit the introduction of an information sharing system in an African...