Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 646,155
Cover Image
On globally optimal punishments in the repeated cournot game
Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - 2016
, we show that the stick-and-carrot punishment à la Abreu (1986) may not be globally optimal. We prove our result by …-and-carrot globally optimal punishment for large cartels, and fully characterise it. Then, we show that for mall cartels, global …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703311
Cover Image
Sustaining cooperation : community enforcement vs. specialized enforcement
Acemoglu, Daron; Wolitzky, Alexander - 2015
We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement … specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective, cooperation is best sustained by a "single enforcer punishment … punishment that enforcers are willing to impose on deviators. Conversely, when the specialized enforcement technology is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491715
Cover Image
When and how the punishment must fit the crime
Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - 2015
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu,1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491781
Cover Image
When and how the punishment must fit the crime
Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - 2015
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485538
Cover Image
Tacit Collusion with Price-Matching Punishments
Lu, Yuanzhu - 2009
provides a game theoretic interpretation of the old kinked demand curve theory which unlike earlier attempts does not depart …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155040
Cover Image
Tacit Collusion with Price Matching Punishments
Lu, Yuanzhu; Wright, Julian - 2005
We re-examine tacit collusion under a simple punishment rule in which firms match any lower price by their rivals, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061873
Cover Image
Entreprises Behavior in Cooperative and Punishment's Repeated Negotiations
Roman, Mihai Daniel - 2012
) such that players cooperate at least one period in cooperative-punishment repeated games. Finally we present a study …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171511
Cover Image
Entry and Vertical Differentiation
Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - 2015
This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014130098
Cover Image
Partial collusion with asymmetric cross-price effects
Savorelli, Luca - 2010
. We characterize the equilibrium of a linear Cournot duopoly with substitute goods, and consider substitution effects …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737876
Cover Image
R&D-Hindering Collusion
Bacchiega, Emanuele; Lambertini, Luca; Mantovani, Andrea - 2008
In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212777