We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own...

International organizations have encouraged national governments to switch from traditional cash-based to business-like accrual accounting, on the presumption that long-run benefits may outweigh substantial implementation and operating costs. We use a quasi-experimental setting to evaluate...

We ask whether, as many seem to think, corruption worsens, and judicial accountability improves, inequality, and investigate this empirically using data from 145 countries 1960.2014. We relate perceived corruption and de facto judicial accountability to gross-income inequality and consumption...

Stefanie Gäbler prepared this study while she was working at the ifo Center for Public Finance and Political Economy. The study was completed in March 2020 and accepted as doctoral thesis by the Department of Economics at the University of Munich. It consists of six distinct empirical essays...

In Deutschland soll ein Lobbyregister eingeführt werden. Fraglich ist, ob das vorgesehene Gesetz ausgewogene Regelungen vorsieht, um für hinreichende Transparenz in der Einflussnahme zu sorgen. Die vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen reichen nicht aus, um die Einflussnahme vollständig und aktuell...

In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for...

Diverse Skandale haben die öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten in Misskredit gebracht. Dies hat erneut die Diskussion entfacht, ob der Rundfunk überhaupt in öffentlicher Hand produziert werden sollte. Die Autoren untersuchen dies aus ökonomischer Sicht, diskutieren die seit Anfang 2013...

We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own...

We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it. In a model where delegation and specific policies are...

The purpose of this study is to assess the nexus between intelligence (or human capital) and statistical capacity in developing countries. The line of inquiry is motivated essentially by: (i) the scarce literature devoted to elucidating poor statistics in developing countries and (ii) an...