We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in bargaining settings. We vary the enforceability of such promises within variants of ultimatum games where the proposer suggest a split between himself, the responder and a char-itable donation. By reneging on initial pledges,...

In a capacity-then-price-setting game we experimentally identify capacity precommitment, the possibility to communicate before price choices, and prior competition experience as crucial factors for collusive pricing. The theoretical analysis determines the capacity thresholds above which firms...

In this paper we test the effect of descriptive "features" on initial strategic behavior in normal form games, where "descriptive" are all those features that can be modified without altering the (Nash) equilibrium structure of a game. We observe that our experimental subjects behave according...

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a short run increase in collusion. However, in a limited...

Coordination of entry decisions in the iterated MEFC (market-entry fixed cost) game with asymmetric players and varying market capacity values can be achieved either without common knowledge of the distribution of types or without trial-to-trial information about number of entrants and...

I consider two new simple bargaining games in which two players bargain over division of a fixed amount of money. Both games are strategically equivalent to the dictator game, in that one player has the unilateral ability to determine the allocation. However, that player can instead choose to...