This study aims to emphasize how performance indicators can be improved by implementing an appropriate management. The counterbalance of a poor funding from the state budget for a program can be achieved by using the levers of the management process functions, particularly referring to the...

We develop a principal-agent model to study fiscal capacity in pre-modern China and Japan. Before 1850, both nations were ruled by stable dictators who relied on bureaucrats to govern their domains. We hypothesize that agency problems increase with the geographic size of a domain. In a large...

The goal of this research is to explore different policy actors’ attitudes towards participation in public decision making. The paper examines objectives of external participants’ involvement and compares various participants’ judgements on the process and results of participation. We...

We use high-quality panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant U.S. attorneys and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those who undertake...

This paper tries to analyse the effects of political clientelism on the performance of public utilities and organizations in Italy. Shortly, clientelism consists in a series of reciprocal convenience-based relationships between politicians and individuals, commanding unequal resources and...

Este trabajo presenta un análisis del proceso de producción y uso de bienes públicos en el marco del proyecto Centros de Desarrollo Comunitario: gestión para el desarrollo social", desarrollado desde la política pública de bienestar social, en Bogotá, por la Secretaría Distrital de...

In this paper, we empirically investigate a channel through which social capital may improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main idea is that voters who share norms of generalized morality demand higher standards of behavior on their elected...

In this study we explore in detail the causes of corruption in China using two different sets of data at the regional level (provinces and cities). We observe that regions with more anti-corruption efforts, histories of British rule, higher openness, more access to media and relatively higher...

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favour in exchange for a bribe. The favour we consider in most of our analysis is the...

This Paper examines the optimal structure of management when a decision-maker must have a mass of information processed before making a decision. They can either delegate processing tasks inside their own organization, in which case they retain full authority over the agents, or they hand over...